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THE INFLUENCE OF JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS:
OPINION ASSIGNMENTS BY THE SENIOR
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
Charles F. Jacobs* and Christopher E. Smith**

I. INTRODUCTION
The 2010 retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens,' one
of the U.S. Supreme Court's longest-serving Justices,2 and his
replacement by Justice Elena Kagan,' led scholars' and
commentators 5 to evaluate the impact of Stevens' and
speculate about how the Court will change in his absence.'
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, St. Norbert College. B.A.,
Kenyon College, 1989; M.A., University of Akron, 1995; Ph.D., University of
Connecticut, 2006.
** Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B., Harvard
College, 1980; M.Sc., University of Bristol (U.K.), 1981; J.D., University of
Tennessee, 1984; Ph.D., University of Connecticut, 1988.
1. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Stevens's Retirement Is Political
Test for Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/u
s/politics/lOstevens.html.
2. Justice Stevens served on the Supreme Court for thirty-four years, two
years shy of the record for longevity established by his predecessor, Justice
William 0. Douglas, who served for thirty-six years. Adam Liptak, The End of
an Era,for Court and Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.co
m/2010/0410/us/politics/10judge.html.
3. Peter Baker, Kagan Is Sworn in as the Fourth Woman, and 1 12th
Justice on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.co
m/2010/08/08/us/08kagan.html.
4. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, An Empathetic Approach to Criminal
Justice: Pro Bono Experiences Informed Justice Stevens' Understanding of
Prisoners'Rights,SCOTUS BLOG (May 12, 2010, 2:03 PM), http://www.scotusbl
og.com/2010/05/an-empathetic-approach-to-criminal-Justice/.
5. See generally, e.g., Editorial, John Paul Stevens: A Judicial Role Model,
94 JUDICATURE 4 (2010).

6. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, CriminalJustice Will Never Be the Same, NAT'L
L.J. (Apr. 12, 2010), http//www.law.com.
7. See, e.g., What Kagan Will Bring to the Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2010,
http://www.roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/what-kagan-will-bringto-the-court/.
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Typically, evaluations of Justice Stevens's performance and
impact on the Supreme Court focus on his judicial opinions.'
However, Justice Stevens also impacted constitutional law
and public policy through the roles that he played on the
Supreme Court,' including both informal roles, such as
serving as the Court's foremost advocate of Miranda rightso
and the adversary system," and formal roles, such as the
first speaker after the Chief Justice during the Justices'
discussions of cases.12
One especially important role played by Justice Stevens
developed in 1994 when the retirement of Justice Harry
Blackmun " made Stevens the senior Justice in the majorityl 4
for the Court's liberal' 5 wing.' 6 As senior Justice in the
8. See, e.g., ROBERT JUDD SICKELS, JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND THE
CONSTITUTION: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 1-31 (Pa. State Univ. Press 1988);
Carol Lee, Reminiscences of Justice Stevens by his Law Clerks: Three Memorable
Opinions, 94 JUDICATURE 9 (2010); Elisabeth Semel, Reflections on Justice John
Paul Stevens's Concurring Opinion in Baze v. Rees: A Fifth Gregg Justice
Renounces CapitalPunishment, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 783 (2010).
9. Christopher E. Smith, The Roles of Justice John Paul Stevens in
CriminalJustice Cases, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 719, 726-42 (2005).
10. See Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens: Staunch Defender
of Miranda Rights, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
11. Smith, supra note 9, at 736-38.
12. Id. at 727.
13. TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, HARRY A. BLACKMUN: THE OUTSIDER JUSTICE
324-25 (2008).
14. Justice Stevens, who was appointed to the Court in 1975, was joined in
the post-Blackmun liberal wing of the Rehnquist Court by junior Justices David
Souter (appointed in 1990), Ruth Bader Ginsburg (appointed in 1993), and
Stephen Breyer (appointed in 1994), and later,-for one term in the Roberts
Court era-by Justice Sonia Sotomayor (appointed in 2009). See Biographies of
CurrentJustices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT, http://www.supremeco
urt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2011).
15. In this article, the terms "liberal" and "conservative" are used to classify
case decisions according to the definitions applied in the Supreme Court
Judicial Data Base in which "[lliberal decisions in the area of civil liberties are
pro-person accused or convicted of a crime, pro-civil liberties or civil rights
claimant, pro-indigent, pro-[Native American] and anti-government in due
process and privacy." Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, DecisionalTrends on
the Warren and Burger Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base
Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103, 103 (1989).

16. During the post-Blackmun Rehnquist Court era (1994-2005), empirical
analyses of specific issues demonstrated voting pattern differences between the
members of the Court's liberal wing (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer) and their more conservative colleagues (Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O'Connor). See, e.g., Christopher E.
Smith, The Rehnquist Court and CriminalJustice:An EmpiricalAssessment, 19
J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 161, 171 (2003).
This liberal wing remained
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majority for cases in which Chief Justice Rehnquist17-and
(or did not
later Chief Justice Roberts '--dissented
participate), Justice Stevens gained the authority to choose
which Justice in the majority would write the opinion for the
Court." Thus, Justice Stevens exercised an important power
that has interested scholars who study the Supreme Court.
With respect to the importance of the power to assign
opinions, Professor Walter Murphy, one of the first scholars of
judicial behavior to theorize about the role and goals of
Justices in the creation of public policy,20 examined judicial
power, in part, through a review of what he titled "the special
case of the [C]hief [J]ustice." 2 1 Murphy noted that the Chief
has "some authority which other members of the Court do not
possess" that includes the power to assign opinion duties
when he is among the majority in a case." Murphy argued
that this power may bolster the Chief Justice's influence
distinctive and intact during the first years of the Roberts Court era (20052009), see, e.g., Madhavi M. McCall, Michael A. McCall & Christopher E. Smith,
Criminal Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court's 2008-2009 Term, 29 Miss. C. L.
REV. 1, 7 (2010), and Justice Sotomayor's high level of agreement with Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer indicated that she simply replaced Justice
Souter as the fourth member of the liberal wing during Justice Stevens's final
term on the Court. Super Stat Pack OT09 Available, SCOTUS BLOG (July 7,
2010, 10:34 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/blog/2010/07/07/super-stat-packot09-available/.
17. William Rehnquist served as Chief Justice of the United States from
1986 to 2005, a period that included the post-Blackmun years from 1994 to
2005. See Linda Greenhouse, William H. Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative
Court, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/0
5/politics/politicsspeciall/05flrehnquist.html.
18. John Roberts was appointed in 2005 by President George W. Bush to
serve as Chief Justice of the United States, a position he held during the final
five terms of Justice Stevens's career. See Thomas R. Hensley, Joyce A. Baugh
& Christopher E. Smith, The First-Term Performance of Chief Justice John
Roberts, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 625, 627-29 (2007).
19. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 125 (4th ed.) ("If the chief
justice voted with the majority, the chief assigns the opinion; in other cases, the
most senior justice in the majority makes the assignment. Because so many
conference votes are unanimous or nearly so, the chief justice is usually among
the majority.").
20. See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 9 (1964).
See also Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Walter F. Murphy: The InteractiveNature
of Judicial DecisionMaking, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 197, 200
(Nancy Maveety ed., 2006) (a discussion of "Murphy's role in moving the
strategic account of judicial decisions from an intriguing idea to a rapidly
expanding and influential form of analysis").
21. MURPHY, supra note 20, at 82.
22. Id. at 84.
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among the members of the Court, create stronger or larger
majority coalitions, serve as a reward or incentive to a
particular Justice, or even be used to encourage the departure
of a Justice through the withholding of assignments.
Murphy's arguments prompted several scholars to test
empirically the influence of opinion assignment on the output
of the Court. As one might expect, this research focuses
almost exclusively on the behavior of the Chief Justice-the
member of the Supreme Court who assigns most majority
opinion writing duties during a typical term. Particular
threads of research include the investigation of assignment
the relationship of assignment to issue
patterns,
the strategic
specialization and work distribution,"
consideration of opinion assignment as it relates to policy
outcomes,26 and the assignment practices during the tenure
of particular Chief Justices.2 7 However, very few authors
have analyzed the behavior of the senior Associate Justice
(hereinafter "SAJ"), either singly or in the aggregate.28 In
order to expand our understanding of the assignment power,
this article presents an initial empirical analysis of Justice
Stevens's actions and his impact in making opinion
assignments through his role as senior Justice in the majority
for many Supreme Court decisions. In light of clues about
division and partisanship among the Justices who served on
23. Id.

24. See generally Elliot E. Slotnick, The Equality Principle & Majority
OpinionAssignment on the United States Supreme Court, 12 POLITY 318 (1979);
Elliot E. Slotnick, Who Speaks for the Court? Majority Opinion Assignment
from Taft to Burger, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 60 (1979).
25. See generally Saul Brenner, Issue Specialization as a Variable in
OpinionAssignment on the U.S. Supreme Court, 46 J. POL. 1217 (1984); Saul
Brenner, Strategic Choice and Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court:
A Reexamination, 35 W. POL. Q. 204 (1982); Elliot E. Slotnick, Judicial Career
Patterns and Majority Opinion Assignment on the Supreme Court, 41 J. POL.
640 (1979); Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Issue Specialization in Majority
Opinion Assignment on the Burger Court, 39 W. POL. Q. 520 (1986).
26. See generally FOREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS & PAUL J.
WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME

(2000); David W. Rohde, Policy Goals, Strategic Choice and Majority Opinion
Assignment in the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 652 (1972).

27. Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Majority Opinion Assignments and
the Maintenance of the Original Coalition on the Warren Court, 32 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 72 (1988); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Opinion Assignment on
the Rehnquist Court, 89 JUDICATURE 121 (2005).
28. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 129
(1998); MALTZMAN ET AL, supra note 26, at 53-55.
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the Court since 1994,29 Justice Stevens's assignment
practices may reveal particular assignment strategies (if they
exist) and their impact on the output of the Court.
II. JUSTICE STEVENS: THE SENIOR ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE IN CONTEXT
Amid the political and legal tumult of the post-Watergate
30
era, President Gerald R. Ford nominated Seventh Circuit
Judge John Paul Stevens to the U. S. Supreme Court to
replace a retiring Justice, William 0. Douglas."1
A
retrospective description of Ford's motives concluded that
"Ford decided to place independence and professionalism over
pandering and gamesmanship as a winning political strategy
for filling a vacancy on the Supreme Court."3 2 President
Ford's advisors were drawn to Justice Stevens because his
legal skills and moderate political image would avoid roiling
the already choppy political waters that existed in the
aftermath of the scandals produced by the administration of
Richard Nixon, and thereby prevent Democrats from using
opposition to the nomination as a political weapon."
After being confirmed to fill the seat on the Court vacated
by Justice Douglas, Justice Stevens proved to be a more
liberal decision maker than many of his Republican political
supporters had expected.34 Instead of occupying the Court's
29. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, A Sign of the Court's Polarization: Choice of
Clerks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/us/politic
s/07clerks.html (evidence that the members of the Court's conservative wing
increasingly choose law clerks exclusively from among applicants who have
served under Republican-appointed court of appeals judges and similar
tendencies for the liberal wing's choices from among those who served under
Democrat-appointed appellate judges).
30. See BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN
INDEPENDENT LIFE 183 (2010) ("But a more urgent historical circumstance
overshadowed the Stevens confirmation process. His appointment to the
Supreme Court played out against national disgust in the judicial system under
President Nixon.").
31. Id. at 182-97.
32. Id. at 183.
33. DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 126-31 (1999).
34. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 322 (2d ed. 1985) ("But as

the history of Presidential expectations has demonstrated so frequently,
nominator Ford was in for a few jurisprudential surprises from the pen of
Justice Stevens.").
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center, as described by one scholar, "[Justice Stevens] fairly
rapidly proved to be found far more frequently with the
'liberal bloc' of Justice[s] Brennan and Marshall, increasingly
By the final years of his
so with the passing of time."3
career, Justice Stevens was praised by liberals"-and
criticized by conservatives 37-for being "a passionate leader of
the [Clourt's liberal wing."38
A comparison between Justice Stevens and his very
liberal," long-serving predecessor,40 Justice Douglas, is
instructive in considering the contextual interaction between
longevity on the Court, liberal perspectives, and impact as the
SAJ. Despite Justice Douglas's legacy as a member of a
liberal bloc of Justices who produced a transformation of
constitutional law in the Warren Court era (1953-1969),41 his
35. Id. at 325.
36. See Editorial, Justice Stevens, N.Y. TIMES Apr. 9, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/opinion/1Osatl.html ("Justice Stevens . . .
has been an eloquent voice for civil liberties, equal rights, and fairness. Mr.
Obama should fill his seat with someone equally committed to these
principles.").
37. See Jeffrey Toobin, After Stevens: What Will the Supreme Court Be Like
Without Its Liberal Leader?, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 2010,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/03/22/100322fa-fact-toobin?currentP
age=all ("'That flexibility and malleability that Stevens talks about is really
just a license for a judge to reach any result he wants,' M. Edward Whelan III, a
former Scalia clerk who runs the conservative Ethics and Public Policy Center,
said.").
38. Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 23, 2007, at 53.
39. See Phillip J. Cooper, Justice William 0. Douglas: Conscience of the
Court, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 189 (Charles
M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds. 1991) ("[Justice Douglas] left the Court
with the legacy of a courageous Justice committed to liberty and equality-a
person willing to stand for the poor as well as the rich, the political outcast as
well as the pillar of the establishment.").
40. Justice Douglas was appointed to the Supreme Court by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1939 and he served until 1975, retiring after being
incapacitated by a stroke that he suffered in December 1974. Id. at 164, 167.
41. The Warren Court era lasted from 1953 to 1969, DAVID M. O'BRIEN,
STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 36 (3d ed. 1993), a
time period defined by Chief Justice Earl Warren's tenure on the Court. Chief
Justice Warren was appointed by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953 and
retired in 1969. ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 259,
511-13 (1997). As described by one scholar, "Warren's Court revolutionized
constitutional law and American society: with the unanimous 1954 school
desegregation ruling, Brown v. Board of Education [347 U.S. 483 (1954)]; ...
and with a series of rulings on criminal procedure that extended the rights of
the accused." O'BRIEN, supra, at 106. Because of numerous liberal decisions
affecting racial discrimination, rights in the criminal justice process, freedom of
religion, and other issues, "Itihe Warren Court is widely recognized to have
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ability to alter legal doctrines and their policy consequences
came primarily through his own opinion writing rather than
through opportunities to choose who would write majority
opinions. Despite the more than three decades that Justice
Douglas spent on the bench, he held the title of SAJ for just
the final four terms of his career.4 2 An Associate Justice can
be the senior Justice in the majority for individual cases
despite not literally being the longest-serving Justice on the
Court, but obviously opportunities to assign opinions may
increase when there are no other associate Justices with
greater seniority. Justice Douglas, for example, was the
senior Justice in the majority for thirty-four individual cases
from 1946 through 1971, but he assumed that role in sixtyfour additional cases during his final four terms when he had
more years of service than any other Associate Justice." By
contrast, from his first opportunity to do so in 1992 through
his retirement in 2010, Justice Stevens assigned 182 majority
opinions,4 5 a number nearly double that of Justice Douglas,
engaged in a liberal constitutional revolution in regard to civil rights and
liberties." THOMAS R. HENSLEY, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH,
THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
xxviii (West Pub. 1997).
42. Justice Douglas spent most of his years on the Court with senior
colleague, Justice Hugo Black, who was appointed by President Roosevelt in
1937, two years earlier than Douglas. Congressional Quarterly, Members of the
Court, in THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK 188 (Carolyn Goldinger ed. 1990).
Justice Black was the senior Associate Justice from 1946-when the next mostsenior Justice, Harlan Fiske Stone, died-until his own retirement in 1971when Justice Douglas became the senior Associate Justice. Id. at 185-86, 190.
43. For example, despite serving in 2010 with three Associate Justices who
had more seniority (Justice Stevens, confirmed in 1975; Justice Antonin Scalia,
confirmed in 1986; and Justice Anthony Kennedy, confirmed in 1988), id. at
206-08, Justice Clarence Thomas, who was confirmed in 1991, O'BRIEN, supra
note 41, at 118-20, gained the opportunity to make the majority opinion
assignment in Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533 (2010), when the four
dissenters in the case were composed of the chief Justice and the three
Associate Justices with greater seniority. As noted by one commentator, "[ilt
was probably the first time that Thomas, who has been on the Court for nearly
20 years, was in a position to assign the writing of a majority opinion on a
decision in which all nine Justices participated." Tony Mauro, Courtside:
Thomas Gets a Rare Chance to Assign Decision, NAT'L L.J., June 16, 2010, http/
/www.law.com/jsp/nlj/legaltimes/PubArticleLTjsp?id=1202462742820&slreturn
=1&hbxlogin=1.
44. LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G.
WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS &
DEVELOPMENTS 642-49 (4th ed. 2007).
45. This research relies on an examination of majority and dissenting
coalitions in all cases decided by the Court from 1994 through the 2009 term.
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whose career on the Court was slightly longer than that of
Stevens.
This difference in the number of opportunities to assign
responsibilities for writing majority opinions reflects
contextual differences affecting the respective careers of
Justices Douglas and Stevens. Specifically, opportunities are
affected by the number of cases in which an SAJ disagrees
with the Chief Justice and by the presence of a more senior
Associate Justice who joins the majority coalition of which a
long-serving associate Justice is a member. Thus, in the case
of Justice Douglas, his opportunities to make opinion
assignments presumably were affected by his time serving
with a Chief Justice, Earl Warren, with whom he agreed on
many controversial issues,4 6 and by the presence of Justice
For the seven cases assigned by Stevens in 1992 and 1993, we utilized the
opinion-assignment sheets distributed by Chief Justice William Rehnquist to
the members of the Court (provided to us with great generosity by Paul J.
Wahlbeck, George Washington University) that indicate who assigned the
opinion-writing duties in each case. The assignment sheets were available from
the Harry Blackmun Papers at the Library of Congress. We were unable to
examine the assignment sheets for the period from 1994 onward because no
public papers from a sitting or retired Justice that provide that particular
information are available. Without this resource, we instead assume that in
any instance that the Chief Justice was not a part of the coalition that formed
the majority at the time the opinion was released, the senior Associate Justice
in the majority awarded opinion-writing duties. This technique is likely to
produce some errors in properly identifying the actual assignor of writing
responsibility because only the assignment sheets reveal the identity of the
Justice authorized to make the choice after the conclusion of any coalitionshifting among the Justices during the process of drafting the opinion of the
Court. Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Constraintson Supreme Court Opinion
Assignment, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1748-49 (2006). However, without the
availability of assignment sheets for recent years, the technique we employ is
all that is available for an analysis of this type and is an approach utilized by
other scholars. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, at 655 n.a. This technique
also creates a limitation when determining authorship of certain cases-in
particular per curiam decisions. In most cases, authorship is indeterminable
without the aid of the Chief Justice's assignment sheets because no author is
indicated. In a limited number of cases, the Chief Justice contributed or joined
a dissenting opinion to the per curiam majority. In these cases, SAJ power was
clear. However, because this occurred infrequently, all per curiam cases were
excluded from our analysis. Additionally, we have excluded the small number
of original jurisdiction cases. Our analysis attempts to describe the ideological
valence of the assignments made by Justice Stevens. Original jurisdiction
cases, however, often are not identified as liberal or conservative and would
confound our results. The data in the tables presented in this paper reflect
these absences.
46. In the categories of issue areas used by the Supreme Court Judicial
Data Base, Justice Douglas and Chief Justice Warren agreed with each other in
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Hugo Black, a like-minded4 7 Associate Justice senior to
Douglas whose career overlapped for all but Douglas's final
four terms on the Court.4 8 By contrast, Justice Stevens
served with three Chief Justices-Warren Burger," William
Rehnquist,so and John Roberts 5"-with whom he disagreed
relatively frequently. 52 He was also the Court's longestserving Associate- Justice for the final sixteen years of his
career.5 3 These contextual differences positioned Justice
Stevens to exert greater potential influence than Justice
Douglas over the outcomes produced by the Court.
It is important to analyze the behavior of Justice Stevens
as the majority opinion assigner because scholars argue that
the Justice empowered to assign authorship duties can use
the power to "pursue [] his [or her] policy goals" 54 and can
"influence the Court by using [assignment choices] as an
more than 77 percent of cases for all categories except tax cases. EPSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 44, at 587.
47. Justice Douglas agreed with Justice Black in more than 77 percent of
cases for all categories of issues, except tax cases and two cases concerning the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 586.
48. See supra note 42.
49. The tenures of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens overlapped
from 1975 through 1986. Congressional Quarterly, supra note at 42, at 206.
50. Justice Stevens served on the Supreme Court during Chief Justice
Rehnquist's entire tenure as Chief Justice, from 1986 to 2005. See supra note
17.

See also JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE

SUPREME COuRT 239 (2007) (Justice Stevens presided over the oral arguments
at the Supreme Court when Chief Justice Rehnquist was hospitalized with
terminal cancer in the final months of his life and his tenure on the Court.).
51. Justice Stevens served with Chief Justice Roberts from the appointment
of the new Chief Justice in 2005, Peter Baker, Bush Nominates Roberts as Chief
Justice, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, at Al, through the retirement of Stevens in
2010, Stolberg & Savage, supra note 1.
52. According to data from the Supreme Court Judicial Data Base, Justice
Stevens agreed with Chief Justice Burger at a rate greater than 70 percent of
cases in only five of thirteen issue categories. EPSTEIN ET AL, supra note 44, at
611. During Chief Justice Rehnquist's tenure as Chief Justice, Justice Stevens
agreed with him at a rate greater than 70 percent of cases in only two of
thirteen issue categories. Id. at 627. In the case of Chief Justice Roberts, initial
analyses with respect to specific categories of cases show similarly modest levels
of agreement with Justice Stevens. See Michael A. McCall, Madhavi M. McCall
& Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 2006-2007 United States
Supreme Court, 76 UMKC L. REV. 993, 1000 tbls.5 & 6 (2008); Michael A.
McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the
2007-2008 United States Supreme Court, 36 S.U. L. REV. 33, 44-45 (2008).
53. See Liptak, supra note 2.
54. See Wahlbeck, supra note 45, at 1733 (discussing the Chief Justice's
power to assign authorship duties).
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agenda-setting tool.""
Justice Stevens is known to have
behaved strategically with respect to some issues, as
documented by Linda Greenhouse's careful analysis of Justice
Stevens's role in the preservation of abortion rights through
timely interactions with selected colleagues in specific cases.
Did his strategic behavior extend to his decisions about
majority opinion assignments when serving in the role of
SAJ?
As noted by observers, "[firom a political standpoint, the
power to assign an opinion may be used strategically by the
senior Justice on a case to secure the fifth vote, in effect, by
appealing to a wavering Justice's pride of authorship."5
Court watchers credit Justice Stevens with strategically
using the power to assign majority opinions to influence the
outcome of the Court's decisions on important issues. For
example, Professor Jeffrey Rosen asserted that:
Stevens has wielded this [majority opinion assignment]
power strategically, assiduously courting [Justice
Anthony] Kennedy to maximize the chances of winning
five votes. In some instances, Stevens has assigned
majority opinions to Kennedy to secure his vote; in others
he has chosen to write majority opinions himself in ways
that will persuade Kennedy to stay in the liberal camp. 18
Using a specific example, Linda Greenhouse claimed that:
In 2000, the Court struck down Nebraska's "partial-birth"
abortion prohibition by a 5-4 vote in Stenberg v. Carhart[,
530 U.S. 914 (2000)]. Justice Kennedy voted in dissent,
and the challenge to Justice Stevens, who had the
assigning power as the senior Associate Justice in the
majority, was to hold Justice O'Connor in the narrow
majority. He assigned the opinion to Justice Breyer,
whose opinion in Stenberg was almost completely devoid of
rhetoric, reading more like an article from a medical
journal than a discussion of a constitutional right. The
point was to reassure a wary Justice O'Connor that the
55. Id.
56. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice John Paul Stevens as Abortion-Rights
Strategist, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 749, 778 (2010) ("As soon as Justice Stevens
saw the trio's draft [opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(2002), he sprang into action, running interference between Justice Blackmun
and the other three Justices with the ultimate goal of producing an opinion, or
as much of an opinion as possible, for the Court.").
57. BARNHART & ScHimCKMAN, supra note 30, at 229-30.
58. Rosen, supra note 38, at 53.
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Court was deferring to medical judgment, not expanding
the right to abortion articulated in [PlannedParenthoodof
Southeastern Pennsylvania v.] Casey[, 530 U.S.

914

(2000)]. The effort succeeded.59
In addition to potentially influencing the outcomes of
specific case decisions, scholars also see the strategic use of
majority opinion assignments as "an agenda-setting tool."60
Because the draft majority opinion is circulated before other
Justices' draft opinions, the choice of the majority author will
affect the terms of the discussion within the Court's opinion
and, as in Linda Greenhouse's example concerning Justice
O'Connor,6 influence whether the opinion will preserve the
majority vote or persuade additional Justices to join the
opinion.6 2 In light of the importance of the opinion-assigning
power, we present an empirical examination of opinion
assignments in order to discern whether and how it
contributes to our knowledge about Justice Stevens's
influence and impact on the U.S. Supreme Court.
III. JUSTICE STEVENS AND THE POWER TO ASSIGN
MAJORITY OPINIONS
Justice Stevens served as the dominant senior Associate
Justice (hereinafter "dominant SAJ")6 for sixteen terms,
filling this role from 1994 until 2010.64 A "dominant SAJ" is a
Justice who-as a result of seniority, the stability of the
membership of the Court, and ideological positiondominates the assignment of opinion-writing duties when the
Chief Justice is not in the majority. 5 Specifically, when
acting in this capacity, the dominant SAJ will assign more
opinions than all of the remaining Associate Justices
Although Justice Stevens made 182 total
combined.
majority opinion assignments in his career, seven of those
assignments came between 1992 and 1994, prior to Justice
59. Greenhouse, supra note 56, at 782.
60. Wahlbeck, supra note 45, at 1733.
61. Greenhouse, supra note 56, at 782.
62. Wahlbeck, supra note 45, at 1734.
63. The "dominant SAJ" concept was developed and defined by co-author
Charles F. Jacobs for this article.
64. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. West Lynn Creamery, Inc., v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); Dep't of
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Blackmun's retirement and, therefore, prior to Justice
Stevens becoming the dominant SAJ.6" As illustrated in
Table 1, for nine of his sixteen years in this position, Justice
Stevens assigned all of the cases that fell to the SAJ for
assignment and, as the dominant SAJ, was never responsible
for fewer than 75 percent of the total assignments made by
Associate Justices. The greatest number of assignments he
made in a single term came in 2004 when he selected the
majority opinion author on twenty-two occasions.
This
constituted 88 percent of the total number of SAJ
assignments and nearly 30 percent of all the assignments for
the term. This rather large number of assignments by
Stevens in 2004-more than 50 percent higher than in any
other term-is explainable by the additional responsibilities
that fell to Justice Stevens when Chief Justice William
Rehnquist was absent while receiving treatment for thyroid
cancer." The data in Table 1 indicate clearly that Justice
Stevens, more so than any other Associate Justice, was for
nearly twenty years a key decision maker responsible for
assigning majority opinions when the Chief Justice dissented,
especially during the lengthy sixteen-year period for which he
was the dominant SAJ.

Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994); C & A Carbone, Inc.,
v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511
U.S. 117 (1994); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of the
State of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93 (1994); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135
(1994); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
68. See supra note 45.
69. Chief Justice Rehnquist missed forty-four oral arguments during his
terminal illness in 2004 and 2005. LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, ORAL
ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH 8 (2008).
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Table 1: Majority Case Assignments
Associate Justices, 1994-2009 Terms

Year

Total
Cases Per
Term

Cases
Assigned
by All
SAJs

Percent of
Total
Cases

Assigned
by
Stevens
as SAJ

by

755

Senior

Percent of
SAJ
Assignments
by Stevens

1992

108

14

13.0%

1

7.1%

1993

85

17

20.0%

6

35.3%

1994

82

13

15.9%

13

100%

1995

77

11

14.3%

11

100%

1996

80

10

12.5%

10

100%

1997

91

10

11.0%

10

100%

1998

77

14

18.2%

14

100%

1999

75

9

12.0%

9

100%

2000

78

15

19.2%

13

86.7%

2001

76

13

17.1%

12

92.3%

2002

72

9

12.5%

9

100%

2003

72

14

19.4%

14

100%

2004

74

25

33.8%

22

88.0%

2005

71

8

11.3%

8

100%

2006

67

10

14.9%

8

80.0%

2007

67

8

11.9%

7

87.5%

2008

74

14

18.9%

12

85.7%

73

4

5.5%

3

75%

1399

218

15.6%

182

83.5%

2009

Italicized figures indicate the years prior to Justice Blackmun's retirement in which
Justice Stevens had not yet become the dominant SAJ.

The SAJ assigns majority opinions in those cases for
which the Chief Justice is a dissenter or does not participate
in the Court's decision." Cases in the former category arise
when the Chief Justice disagrees with a matter of consensus
among the other Justices, as when the Chief Justice is a solo
dissenter or one of only two dissenters.71 These cases also
arise when the Court is deeply divided and the Chief Justice,
70. See BAUM, supra note 19, at 125.
71. For example, in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997), Chief Justice
Rehnquist was the lone dissenter when eight Justices invalidated a Georgia
statute requiring drug testing of political candidates. Justice Stevens had the
opportunity to select the majority opinion author from among a wide array of
colleagues and he chose Justice Ginsburg for the task.
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while joined by like-minded colleagues, supports a case
outcome that is endorsed by fewer than five Justices." Table
2 shows how frequently these situations arose during the
years when Justice Stevens was SAJ for opinion assignments
and, moreover, provides a picture of the issue areas for which
Justice Stevens was able to potentially exert influence
through the assignment power.7
In addition, Table 2 shows
the distribution of opinion assignments by Justice Stevens as
he chose which colleagues would write for the majority in
specific cases.
His choice of opinion writer may have been based on the
exercise of strategic thinking by Justice Stevens and he has
acknowledged employing a strategic approach in at least
some of those assignment decisions.
As described by
Professor Jeffrey Rosen after interviewing Justice Stevens:
When he is in the majority, Stevens is careful not to
lose votes that start off on his side, often assigning the
opinion to Kennedy when Kennedy seems to be on the
fence. "Sometimes," he told me, "in all candor, if you think
somebody might not be solid" after casting a vote in
conference, "it might be wiser to let that person write the
opinion," because after defending a position at length,
people "tend to become even more convinced" than when
they started. For example, Stevens was effective in
winning over Kennedy by asking him to write the majority
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,7 4 the 2003 decision striking
down sodomy laws, which many liberals consider the
Brown v. Board of Education7 5 of the gay rights
movement. "It worked out O.K.," Stevens told me with
typical understatement. "I don't know if I'm entitled to
the credit or Tony's entitled to the credit, because he wrote
72. For example, in Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997), Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined three other dissenters in disagreeing with the fivemember majority's decision that corrections officers employed by private firms
rather than by the state do not enjoy the benefits of qualified immunity against
civil rights lawsuits by prisoners. Justice Stevens chose Justice Breyer to write
the majority opinion, perhaps to seek an opinion in tone and content would
retain the support of all five members of the narrow majority.
73. We are using the categories employed by EPSTEIN ET AL, supra note 44,
at 246, to distinguish among the issue areas treated by the Justices. These
include criminal procedure, civil rights, economic cases, judicial process and
procedure, First Amendment cases, issues of federalism, due process, privacy,
unions, and federal tax issues. Id.
74. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
75. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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an exceptional opinion."76
Justice Stevens also had the option of assigning opinions
to himself in order to craft his reasoning strategically as a
means to gain or maintain the vote of one or more specific
Justices.7 ' As Professor Rosen wrote:
In other cases, Stevens has written the majority opinion
himself in an effort to shore up Kennedy's vote. In April
[2007], for example, in a 5-to-4 case,78 the [Clourt allowed
a lawsuit to proceed against the Environmental Protection
Agency for its refusal to regulate global warming under
the Clean Air Act; by citing several of Kennedy's previous
opinions in his own opinion, Stevens persuaded Kennedy
to stay in the liberal camp.79
Although Professor Rosen is not alone in crediting Justice
Stevens with strategic thinking in opinion-assignment
decisions, conclusions about the impact of those decisions are
obviously speculative. For example, Justice Kennedy has
never stated that assignments to him or the phrasing of
decisions by Justice Stevens led him to vote in a specific way
on a case.
As indicated by Table 2, among the 182 majority opinion
assignments Justice Stevens made during his career, he most
frequently assigned authorship in criminal procedure cases
(sixty-five cases or 35.7 percent of the total). He made just
under half as many assignments in civil rights cases with a
total of thirty-two. Significant numbers of assignments were
also made for economic issues (twenty), as well as judicial
process and the First Amendment (each with seventeen).
Much more infrequently, Stevens had the chance to assign
authorship in due process (six), privacy (five), union (four),
and tax cases (two). He also had regular opportunities to
challenge Chief Justice Rehnquist for dominance in the area
of federalism, an area of law that held particular interest for
the Chief Justice, with a total of fourteen case assignments.
76. Rosen, supra note 38, at 53-54.
77. See Warren Richey, The Quiet Ascent of Justice Stevens, CHRISTIAN ScI.
MONITOR, July 9, 2004, http-//www.csmonitor.com/2004/0709/pOlsO3-usju.html
("Sometimes the assigning justice assigns the case to himself and then assumes
the role of judicial diplomat, taking care to adequately address the concerns of
each member of the majority.").
78. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (citation not
included in original).
79. Rosen, supra note 38, at 54.
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As previous research has indicated, SAJs tend to assign
more cases to themselves than to any other Associate
Stevens proves to be no exception to this
Justice. 0
phenomenon, giving himself the opportunity to pen sixty-one
decisions or 34 percent of all his assignments. Nearly onethird of the self-assignments (nineteen) were made in the
area of criminal procedure. He also kept 28 percent of the
civil rights assignments (nine) and 47 percent of the First
Amendment assignments (eight) for himself while
distributing away all of the privacy and federal tax decisions.
As a percentage of cases in each issue area, however, Stevens
wrote the greatest proportion of decisions in the area of due
process, serving as the decision author in four of the six cases
that he had the power to assign. Similarly, he wrote half of
the fourteen federalism cases and half of the four union cases.
By comparison, he wrote just 29 percent of the criminal
procedure decisions that he assigned.
One set of scholars who have conducted statistical
studies of the assigning practices of SAJs concluded that "the
[A]ssociate [Justice ... largely assigns opinions to those
[J]ustices who are ideologically allied" when not assigning the
opinion to him- or herself." As Table 2 shows, this conclusion
is generally accurate when looking specifically at the opinionassigning behavior of Justice Stevens. He made a total of 36
percent of his opinion assignments to the three Justices
(Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter) who most frequently shared
his conclusions about case outcomes. 8 2 However, as possible
evidence of strategic behavior, he deviated from the general
conclusion of the aforementioned statistical studies83 by
making more opinion assignments to Justice Kennedy (14
percent) than he did individually to his usual allies, Justices
Souter (11 percent) and Breyer (10 percent), despite the fact
that his rates of agreement on case outcomes with Justice
In particular, Justice
Kennedy were markedly lower.'
80. MALTZMAN ET AL, supra note 26, at 53.
81. Id.
82. For example, during the Rehnquist Court era, Justice Stevens had his
highest rates of agreement for civil rights cases with Justices Ginsburg (91.5%),
Breyer (92%), and Souter (86.0%). EPSTEIN ET AL, supra note 44, at 626-27
tbls.6-9.
83. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
84. For example, Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy only agreed with
each other in 65.3% of civil rights cases during the Rehnquist Court era.
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Stevens assigned a higher number of criminal procedure
cases to Justice Kennedy (nine) than he did to anyone other
than himself (nineteen) and Justice Souter (eleven), despite
the fact that he agreed with Justice Kennedy in only 53.8
percent of criminal procedure cases."
This may provide
evidence that Justice Stevens strategically assigned opinions
to Justice Kennedy in accordance with the widely-recognized
notion that:
[t]he key to exerting influence within the high court is the
ability to hold the majority during the opinion writing
process. Sometimes this is done by assigning the case to
the justice who is most likely to jump to the other side
should the opinion be written too narrowly or too
broadly.86
It is similarly notable that in three out of four privacy
cases," Justice Stevens assigned the opinion to Justice
Kennedy. Justice Stevens has been described as "notably
successful in building majorities by courting his fellow
[J]ustices-in particular, [Justice] Kennedy.""
In the
previously mentioned blockbuster case of Lawrence v. Texas,"
concerning the invalidation of criminal laws aimed at gays'
and lesbians' private, non-commercial sexual conduct, Justice
O'Connor provided a sixth vote to strike down the law, but
she based her conclusion on equal protection grounds.90
Justice Stevens needed to retain Justice Kennedy's vote in
order to have a majority that placed private sexual conduct
squarely under the privacy aspect of the due process right to
EPSTEIN ET AL, supra note 44, at 626 tbls.6-9.

85. Id.
86. Richey, supra note 77.
87. Among the cases assigned by Justice Stevens that are in the Privacy
category of the Supreme Court Judicial Data Base, Justice Kennedy wrote
majority opinions for Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating state
ballot issue barring localities from enacting antidiscrimination laws to protect
gays and lesbians), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating state
statute criminalizing consensual, non-commercial, private sexual behavior by
same-sex couples), and Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (ruling against
use of federal drug law to block physician-assisted suicides authorized by state
law). Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion in the fourth case, Chandler
v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (invalidating state statute requiring drug testing
of candidates for political office).
88. Rosen, supra note 38, at 53.
89. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying
text.
90. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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liberty. Two other opinions assigned to Justice Kennedy by
One
Justice Stevens concerned privacy-related issues.
addressed discriminatory laws targeting gays and lesbians"
and the other addressed a state's right-to-die law." Both
cases had six-member majorities," but Justice Stevens may
have assigned the opinions to Justice Kennedy for fear that
opinions written in a too-liberal manner may have lost the
votes of both Justices Kennedy and O'Connor and thereby
turned the outcome in a different and, in the view of Justice
Stevens, undesirable direction.
There are also cases involving the other Justices with
generally conservative voting records in which Justice
Stevens may have assigned the opinion to the most tentative
member of the majority in order to retain his or her support
for a liberal outcome. In Grutter v. Bollinger,94 for example,
the major case that is regarded as narrowly preserving the
use of race as one factor for admissions decisions in higher
education," Justice Stevens assigned the opinion to Justice
O'Connor whose opinion in the 5-to-4 decision endorsed the
way that the University of Michigan School of Law applied
demographic factors as one component of admissions
decisions.96 Justice O'Connor's record of inconsistent support
for affirmative action is encapsulated in one scholar's
description of her decisions on the issue:
Throughout [Justice] O'Connor's career on the high bench,
she was a swing vote on the preferential use of racial
criteria in hiring, promotion, and termination of
employment decisions, sometimes approving but more
often invalidating affirmative action plans for their failure
91. Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
92. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 243.
93. The six-member majorities in both cases consisted of Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kennedy, and O'Connor.
94. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
95. See, e.g., NANCY MAVEETY, QUEEN'S COURT: JUDICIAL POWER IN THE

REHNQUIST ERA 93 (2008) ("[The Rehnquist Court considered the two cases
from the University of Michigan and its law school; these became the vehicle for
the majority's decisive and final statement on the policy practice of affirmative
action.").
96. See FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY'S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL
AND NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY 126 (2009) ("In Grutter, the Court

affirmed the constitutionality of the University of Michigan's law school
admissions program, which took race into account to admit a 'critical mass' of
students from three specific racial and ethnic groups.").
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to incorporate a narrowly tailored use of racial
classifications. 9
In light of the uncertain strength of Justice O'Connor's
support for affirmative action in higher education, according
to Jeffrey Toobin, Justice Stevens made a strategic selfsacrifice in assigning the opinion to her:
The [opinion assignment] decision was up to Stevens,
because he was the senior [Associate Justice in the
majority]. . . . Would Stevens really be selfless enough to
hand off Grutter. . . ? He had just turned eighty-three.

How many more big opinions could he expect to come his
way? ...
[Justice] Stevens's decision took wisdom and
selflessness. [Justice] O'Connor was clearly the shakiest
member of the majority in Grutter and if Stevens had kept
the case for himself-as many other [J]ustices might have
done in similar circumstances-he might ultimately have
lost her vote and thus the majority. But Stevens cared
more about the issues and less about his own ego .

. .

. So,

with the shrewdness of age, Stevens handed the prize
Grutter assignment-the biggest case since Bush v. Goreto [Justice] O'Connor.98
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas wrote
Stevens-assigned opinions in cases that bore the same
characteristics: a lone conservative Justice joining the four
most liberal Justices (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter)
to provide the crucial fifth vote that produced a liberal
However, because Justices Scalia and Thomas
decision."
typically display such certitude about how their originalist
approach to constitutional interpretation produces correct
results, 00 it is more difficult to attribute to Justice Stevens
97. MAVEETY, supra note 95, at 93 (citation omitted).
98. TOOBIN, supra note 50, at 222-23.
99. For example, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in United States
See infra notes 101-02 and
v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
accompanying text. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion in United States
v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998). See infra note 103-04 and accompanying
text.
100. For examples of assertive originalist opinions by Justice Scalia and
Thomas, see District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (Scalia
majority opinion employing originalist interpretation to identify a limited
Second Amendment right to ownership of handguns kept in a home for selfdefense purposes), and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (relying on originalism to argue that- the Eighth Amendment's
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the credit for using opinion assignments to gain their votes.
Thus Justice Scalia's Stevens-assigned majority opinion in
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez'01 concerning a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to choose his own counsel
addressed an issue that may have flowed naturally from
Justice Scalia's originalist approach, as "Justice Scalia has
become known for a strict, almost absolutist position on the
Sixth Amendment's various guarantees." 0 2 However, in a
case of first impression for which there may be a lack of
consensus about the Constitution's original intent, these
Justices may have been susceptible to influence through
Justice Stevens's opinion assignment decisions aimed at
gaining or maintaining a slim majority. In one possible
example, Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for a five-member
majority in United States v. Bajakajian,08 a decision
supporting a criminal defendant's Excessive Fines Clause
claim that Justice Kennedy, in dissent, decried as "the first
time in history [that] the Court strikes down a fine as
excessive under the Eighth Amendment.""o4
Justice Stevens himself modestly downplays perceptions
about his own influence. 105 Commentators write about "the
ability of John Paul Stevens, the senior associate justice in
tenure as well as in age, to deliver a majority"10 6 and "'his
unique combination of personality and persuasiveness."10o
Yet, Justice Stevens claims that outsiders possess
exaggerated beliefs about the Justices' ability to change each
others' mindso" because it is difficult to persuade people to
protections do not apply to conditions or events inside prisons).

101. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 140.
102. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Basic Right to Choose Defense
Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/washi
ngton/27scotus.html.
103. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 321.
104. Id. at 344 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
105. Interview by Christopher E. Smith with Justice John Paul Stevens,
Associate Justice (ret.), U.S. Supreme Court, Washington, D.C. (July 29, 2010).
106. Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is at Court's Helm, but He Isn't Yet in
Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/02/washingt
on/02scotus.html.
107. David G. Savage, Sizing Up the Supreme Court After Justice John Paul
Stevens, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, httpi/articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/22/nati
on/la-na-court-stevens22-2010mar22.
108. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 38, at 53.
In general, Stevens said, the idea that a (J]ustice can sway his
colleagues through collegiality and personal lobbying-a talent often
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alter their conclusions after they have read the lawyers' briefs
and heard oral arguments in a case. 0 According to Justice
Stevens, "'you very rarely win votes if there aren't five votes
persuaded after our conference.

. .

. Very rare.""'o

Justice

Stevens's reluctance to claim credit for influencing the
outcomes of decisions is completely consistent with his
characteristic modesty."' However, he has acknowledged
assigning majority opinions in close cases to "'somebody [who]
might not be solid""' 2 in their support for the initial
majority's conclusions. This acknowledgement leaves open
the possibility that the foregoing examples may accurately
describe situations in which he was "successful in building
majorities by courting his fellow Justices . . . [through]

methods of persuasion [that] are intellectual rather than
personal, and .

.

. are closely tied to the [Clourt's procedure

for deciding cases""'-including the procedure for opinion
assignments by the SAJ.
IV. OPINION ASSIGNMENTS AND THE IMPACT OF
JUSTICE STEVENS AS DOMINANT SENIOR ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE
As the discussion in the preceding section indicates, there
is evidence that Justice Stevens employed strategic opinionassignment practices. However, analysts must necessarily
speculate about how those strategies operated in individual
cases. It is perhaps easier to evaluate the impact of majority
opinions assigned by Justice Stevens to himself or to
individual colleagues by examining the extent to which those
attributed to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.-is exaggerated. He
suggested that in most cases, [Jiustices cannot be swayed to change
their votes once they make up their minds, and when they can be
swayed, it is only as a result of legal arguments, not charm or
charisma.
Id.
109. Interview, supra note 105.
110. Rosen, supra note 38, at 53.
111. See, e.g., Cliff Sloan, In Praiseof John Paul Stevens, MSNBC.COM (May
6, 2005), httpJ/webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:B7BgU6c1tOU
J:msnbc.msn.com/id/7748622/ns/newsweek-newsweek-national news+Cliff+
Sloan,+%22n+Praise+of+John+Paul+Stevens%22&cd=1&hl=en&ct-clnk&gl=u
s&cient=firefox-a ("With his bow-tied, Midwestern demeanor and perpetual air
of genial bemusement, he is the quintessential nice guy. . .
112. Rosen, supra note 38, at 53.
113. Id.
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opinions decided issues in "important cases"" because
opinions in such cases "may be able to influence the
development of significant policy consequences for American
The following discussion presents selected
society.""'
of
important Stevens-assigned opinions, using
examples
standard scholarly sources for labeling cases as
"important,"116 as a means for illuminating the impact that
Justice Stevens had in his role as dominant SAJ.

114. There is no consensus among scholars about evaluating the significance
of specific Supreme Court decisions. Beverly Blair Cook, Measuring the
Significance of United States Supreme Court Decisions, 55 J. POL. 1127, 1127
(1993). The concept of "important cases" is typically employed by scholars
through the use of sources, such as textbooks and newspaper articles, that
selectively highlight the Supreme Court's most significant decisions during a
given term. See Christopher E. Smith, Joyce Ann Baugh, Thomas R. Hensley &
Scott Patrick Johnson, The First-Term Performance of Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, 78 JUDICATURE 74, 79 (1994).
115. Scott P. Johnson & Christopher E. Smith, David Souter's First Term on
the Supreme Court: The Impact of a New Justice, 75 JUDICATURE 238, 241
(1992).
116. For Supreme Court decisions through the 2004 term, "important"
cases are those that were labeled as such by both the New York Times
and Congressional Quarterly and organized for presentation in EPSTEIN
ET AL, supra note 44, 93-174. For the 2005 through 2009 terms, the New
York Times is the sole source, highlighting cases in end-of-year summaries
of the Supreme Court's recent terms: 2005 term-Greenhouse, supra
note 106; 2006 term-Notable Cases of the 2006-7 Term So Far,
www.nytimes.com/ref/washington/scotuscasesPUNITIVEDAMAGES.html (last
visited Jan. 9, 2011); 2007 term-Major Rulings of the 2007-8 Term (June 29,
2008), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2008/06/29/Washington/majorFull.j
pg; 2008 term-Major Rulings of the 2008-9 Term, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2009/07/01/us/Olscotus.graphicl.html;
2009 term-Major Rulings of the 2009-2010 Term, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2010/06/30/us/politics/30scotusThese sources fit the specific criteria
graphic.html?ref=supremecourt.
employed by scholars in selecting Supreme Court cases for analysis based on
the importance of the case.
Numerous criteria can be utilized to assess the importance of Supreme
Court cases, depending on the purposes and requirements of the
researcher. Our research requires that we use sources which have
several characteristics: (1) the source should be familiar and legitimate
to researchers in the field; (2) the source should be current, allowing us
to classify recently decided cases; (3) the source should be reliable,
allowing researchers to produce the same list of important cases; and
(4) the source should be consistent over time.
HENSLEY et al, supra note 41, at 864.
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A. Legal Protectionsfor Gays and Lesbians
As previously described, two opinions that Justice
Stevens assigned to Justice Kennedy provided the
constitutional basis for preventing states from enacting laws
that would treat gays and lesbians as less deserving than
other citizens of the protection of the law. In Romer v.
Evans,"' Justice Kennedy's opinion on behalf of a sixmember majority invalidated, on equal protection grounds, a
referendum approved by Colorado voters that barred
municipalities from enacting anti-discrimination ordinances
to protect gays and lesbians from unfair treatment in
housing, employment, and other important aspects of life.
The significance of the decision was evident in the conflict
among the Justices that was visible at the oral announcement
of the decision:
For extra emphasis and to get more notice, [Justice]
Scalia read portions of his dissenting statement from the
bench that May morning.
His voice rising as he
condemned the ruling, Scalia said the decision in Romer
v. Evans undermined the structure of American law that
he said allowed distinctions between homosexual and
heterosexual conduct. [Justice] Scalia accused the Court
of signing on to the "so-called homosexual agenda." A few
minutes earlier, Kennedy had read aloud parts of his
opinion, a document that would later cause a number of
gay and lesbian lawyers to weep in appreciation. Such
was the power of the competing emotions the opinions
roused." 8
Similarly, Justice Kennedy's Stevens-assigned majority
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, broke new ground in its
declaration with respect to the liberty interests that protect
private sexual conduct for all adults. As described by Jeffrey
Toobin:
There was no mistaking the significance of Kennedy's
opinion. The point was not that the Court was halting
sodomy prosecutions, which scarcely took place anymore.
Rather, the Court was announcing that gay people could
not be branded as criminals simply because of who they
117. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
118. JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF

SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 218 (2009).
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were. They were citizens. They were like everyone
else.... The people who had devoted their lives to that
cause understood precisely what had happened, which was
why, to a degree unprecedented in the Court's history, the
benches [in the courtroom] were full of men and women
sobbing with joy. 119
Whether or not strategic opinion assignments by Justice
Stevens were necessary to maintain the majorities for these
two decisions, he was a key figure in these decisions that
expanded the protection of the law to people historically
victimized by discriminatory treatment.
B. CriminalSentences
Justice Stevens assigned opinions in important cases that
advanced his career-long preference for narrowing the
circumstances in which capital punishment could be
In Ring v. Arizona,121 Justice Stevens
permissible.12 0
assigned to Justice Ginsburg the responsibility for writing the
majority opinion that invalidated on Sixth Amendment
grounds capital sentencing schemes that permitted judges to
justify the imposition of the death penalty by employing
factual findings not made by the jury. Justice Ginsburg's
opinion reversed the Court's earlier precedent-Walton v.
Arizona 12 2 -which had permitted such sentencing practices.
In overturning this precedent, Justice Ginsburg's opinion
effectively advanced the very arguments that Justice Stevens
had presented in a dissenting opinion in Walton concerning
his views about the Sixth Amendment's requirement that
factual determinations for sentencing purposes be made by
the jury during trial and not by the judge as a post-trial
conclusion. 123 The Ring decision was one of a series of cases
in which the Court followed Justice Stevens's Walton dissent
and required jury fact-finding for sentencing in non-capital
contexts, too. Among these other decisions was Blakely v.

119. TOOBIN, supra note 50, at 190.
120. See generally, James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is
Better: Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
1607 (2006) (discussion of Justice Stevens's role the development of the
Supreme Court's capital punishment jurisprudence).
121. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
122. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
123. Id. at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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' an important Stevens-assigned opinion in
Washington, 24
which Justice Scalia found a violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury when a state non-capital
sentencing
procedure
permitted
post-trial
factual
determinations by the judge to play a role in enhancing the
offender's sentence.12' Because the Court now has a series of
precedents on this issue and these precedents are supported
by conservative Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice Stevens's
impact on this area of law may have staying power even if the
Court's composition becomes more conservative in the future.
In considering the categories of offenders and offenses
eligible for the death penalty, Justice Stevens assigned to
2
himself the majority opinion in Atkins v. Virginia,1
6 the case
declaring that the imposition of capital punishment on
mentally retarded offenders violates the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. In Roper v.
Simmons,12 a narrow majority imposed a similar prohibition
on the application of the death penalty to offenders who
committed their capital crimes while under the age of
eighteen. Justice Stevens assigned the Roper opinion to
Justice Kennedy, just as he did with the opinion assignment
in Kennedy v. Louisiana,128 the case that found an Eighth
Amendment violation in the imposition of capital punishment
for the non-fatal rape of a child. Although these decisions are
vulnerable to reversal by a future Court with only a modest
change in composition, they currently have imposed
significant changes on the law of capital punishment.
C. Terrorism Suspects in U.S. Custody
Justice Stevens assigned to Justice Kennedy the majority
opinion in Boumediene v. Bush,129 the decision that confirmed
the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus for Guantanamo
detainees, despite efforts by the Bush administration and
Congress to create a statute to deny federal court jurisdiction

124. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
125. Id. at 313 ("lElvery defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor
prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the punishment.").
126. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
127. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
128. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
129. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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over such cases. 30 This 2008 decision came four years after a
self-assigned majority opinion by Justice Stevens in Rasul v.
Bush13 1 that rejected an earlier effort by the Bush
administration to claim that foreign detainees at the U.S.
Navy base in Cuba were outside of the jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts. Although Rasul was not classified as an "important"
decision, it reinforces the recognition of Justice Stevens's
attention to and impact on this significant issue concerning
federal court jurisdiction, the rights of foreign detainees, and
the Bush administration's attempt to create executive
authority to impose indefinite, incommunicado detention on

terrorism suspects.1 32
In an important case on a related issue, Justice Stevens
assigned to himself the majority opinion in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 3 the decision that rejected executive and
congressional efforts to create military commission
procedures for trials of foreign terrorism detainees in which
the detainees would have few of the normal evidentiary and
procedural protections that are essential elements of criminal
trials. The effect of the decision was to force the U.S.
government to develop fairer procedures for the planned
military commission proceedings. 134 This opinion by Justice
Stevens is likely to stand as one of the most important and
memorable in history because, in Jeffrey Toobin's words, "the
case was crucial, and not just because the detainees in
Guantanamo Bay faced the possibility of execution by their
American captors. The lawsuit was about defining the
meaning of the Constitution in the age of terror."'"' The
opinion by Justice Stevens in the case was all the more
130. Kate Zernike, Senate PassesDetainee Bill Sought By Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/28/washington/29detaincnd.ht
ml.
131. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
132. There were additional Supreme Court decisions concerning both
American and foreign detainees, including an American terrorism suspect held
in U.S. military prisons. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004);
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). See also Christopher E. Smith &
Cheryl D. Lema, Justice Clarence Thomas and Incommunicado Detention:
Justificationsand Risks, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 783 (2005).
133. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
134. See Kate Zernike, Senate Approves Broad New Rules to Try Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES Sept. 29, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/29/washington/29d
etain.html.
135. TOOBIN, supra note 50, at 322.
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striking because "[writing in his usual restrained style,
Stevens made clear that he and his colleagues regarded the
Bush [administration] position as something close to
lawless.""' Future Supreme Court majorities may decide to
compromise the Constitution in the aftermath of new conflicts
with terrorist groups, either from a fear-driven concern about
homeland security or a philosophical desire to increase
executive power. 3
Yet the opinions assigned by Justice
Stevens, including those that he assigned to himself, will
continue to serve as reminders to future Justices and the
public about the importance of maintaining a system of law to
limit government power and protect individuals from
unfairness and abuse. And those opinions will presumably
provide precedential ammunition for those who defend
federal court jurisdiction, due process, and the constitutional
entitlement to habeas corpus.
D. FirstAmendment
In 2000, Justice Stevens assigned to himself the majority
opinion in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe. 3 8
The Supreme Court examined an Establishment Clause
challenge to a public high school's practice of permitting
student-led prayers to be read over the public address system
at home varsity football games. 13 On behalf of a six-member
majority, Justice Stevens concluded that the school's policy
was invalid as a violation of the First Amendment.' 4 0 The
opinion expanded the applicability and confirmed the
continuing vitality of the Court's 1992 precedent in Lee v.
Weisman' that invalidated clergy-led prayers at public
school graduation ceremonies.
In 2010, Justice Stevens was SAJ in the majority for
136. Id. at 321.
137. The aftermath of the tragic terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001
provided ample evidence of the inclinations of many Americans, including
government officials and even Supreme Court Justices, to compromise or
eliminate constitutional principles that previously enjoyed consensus support by
both liberal and conservative Supreme Court Justices. See Christopher E.
Smith, The Bill of Rights After September 11": Principles or Pragmatism?, 42
DUQ. L. REV. 259 (2004).
138. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
139. Id. at 294.
140. Id. at 313.
141. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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ChristianLegal Society v. Martinez,14 2 a case that arose when
a Christian student organization was denied recognition and
resources as a registered student organization by the
University of California Hastings College of Law. 143 The law
school regarded its Nondiscrimination Policy as requiring
registered student organizations to accept all students as
members, regardless of those individuals' status or beliefs.'"
The Christian student organization, however, required its
members to sign a "statement of faith" and pledge to live their
private lives according to specific principles that prohibited,
among other things, sexual activity outside of marriage and
"unrepentant homosexual conduct."14 5 In Justice Ginsburg's
opinion, the five-member majority rejected the student
group's claim of a constitutional rights violation and upheld
the "all-comers" policy of the law school for recognized
student organizations.' 46 Justice Stevens wrote a concurring
opinion to specifically refute arguments raised in the
dissenting opinion by Justice Alito.14 7 As with other issues
decided by a deeply-divided Court, matters concerning
religion are vulnerable to possible reversal if the Court's
composition changes in the future. Whatever decisions a
newly-constituted Court may make in the future, the opinions
assigned and written by Justice Stevens will provide
ammunition for those who wish to defend current doctrines
that prohibit sponsored prayer in public schools and that
support public universities' nondiscrimination policies for
registered student organizations.
E. FederalPower
An important case early in Justice Stevens's postBlackmun period as dominant SAJ concerned an attempt by
Arkansas to impose term limits on its representatives and
senators in the U.S. Congress. In U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton,4 8 Justice Stevens's self-assigned majority opinion
on behalf of a narrow five-Justice bloc invalidated the term
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
Id. at 2980-81.
Id. at 2979.
Id. at 2980.
Id. at 2993-95.
Id. at 2995 (Stevens, J., concurring).
U.S Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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limits provision of the Arkansas Constitution as violating the
sections of the U.S. Constitution that address the
qualifications of members of Congress.
In 2005, Justice Stevens's self-assigned majority opinion
in Gonzales v. Raich"' held that congressional power under
the Commerce Clause included the authority to prohibit local
cultivation and use of marijuana in California, even though
such actions for medicinal purposes were permitted under
state law.5 0 Justice Stevens emphasized that the issue in the
case was solely about congressional authority to regulate
economic activities,' 5 ' and therefore the Court was not called
upon to consider the "respondents' strong arguments that
they will suffer irreparable harm because ... marijuana does
have valid therapeutic purposes."5 2 The case was very
significant because it gave Justice Stevens the opportunity to
establish a new precedent that affirmed the importance of
federal legislative power for the regulation of economic
activities and to push back against conservative Justices'
successful efforts to limit the scope of congressional commerce
power.' 5 3
The foregoing selected examples of Justice Stevens's
majority opinion assignments as SAJ help to illuminate the
range of issues affected by Stevens-assigned opinions and his
personal impact in shaping the law, especially for those cases
in which he wrote self-assigned majority opinions. Clearly,
Justice Stevens left his imprint on the development of law for
the important issues of the day that were presented to the
nation's highest court during his years as the dominant SAJ.
V. CONCLUSION
The retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens, one of the
149. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
150. Id. at 17-19.
151. See id. at 9 ("The question before us . . . is whether Congress' power to
regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions
of those markets that are supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally.").
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (narrow
majority on Supreme Court invalidated as an excessive assertion of
congressional commerce power a federal statute that sought to give women
opportunities to sue those who subjected them to violent victimization); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (narrow majority on Supreme Court
invalidated as an excessive assertion of congressional commerce power a federal
statute aimed at keeping guns away from schools).
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longest-serving Justices in U.S. Supreme Court history,
marks an occasion for evaluating his place in history and his
impact on law and policy. Not surprisingly, Justice Stevens
himself says that "[y]ou judge [JIustices by the work product
that they produce when they're on the Court.""' Thus, with
respect to himself, he observed that "I just hope people will
make their judgments based on what my written opinions
say, and not on what people say they say."' Because Justice
Stevens was a prolific author of opinions, 1 6 there is no doubt
that his words and reasoning will continue to influence and
define American law for years after his final participation in a
Supreme Court decision. 157
Judicial opinions alone do not define a Justice's impact
while serving on the Court. Social scientists have recognized
that institutional aspects of the Court's structure and
procedures, including opinion assignment, may affect case
outcomes and the content of opinions.15 8 As demonstrated in
the foregoing discussion, Justice Stevens had numerous
opportunities to influence the Court's opinions through his
role as dominant SAJ. Because of circumstances that led him
to be the longest-serving Associate Justice for the final
sixteen terms of his career at a historical moment when he
154. BRIAN LAMB, SUSAN SWAIN & MARK FARKAS, EDS., THE SUPREME
COURT: A C-SPAN BOOK FEATURING THE JUSTICES IN THEIR OWN WORDS 50
(2010).

155. Barbara A. Perry, Justice John Paul Stevens' Supreme Court Odyssey:
From Gerald Ford Republican to Barack Obama Democrat, Center for Politics
Online Guest Column, Apr. 15, 2010, http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalbal
l/articles/bap2010041501/.
156. By the end of the 2004 term, Justice Stevens had written 362 majority
opinions, 560 dissenting opinions, and 341 concurring opinions. EPSTEIN ET AL,
supra note 44, at 636.
157. Supreme Court precedents that define law can remain valid and vital
indefinitely, as evidenced by current precedents that continue to define the law
long after their authors have left the Court. For example, Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958), which was written by Chief Justice Earl Warren (Supreme Court
tenure 1953-1969, THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK, supra note 42, at 197)
continues to provide the rule for evaluating claims concerning the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause more than fifty years after the precedent was
established. See JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 243,
255 n.161 (9th ed. 2010).
158. See Sue Davis, The Chief Justice and Judicial Decision-Making: The
Institutional Basis for Leadership on the Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 135-54 (Cornell W.
Clayton & Howard Gilman eds., 1999) (review of social science research on the
role of the Chief Justice, including opinion-assignment power).
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regularly disagreed with the Chief Justices with whom he
served, Justice Stevens played an especially important role as
an assigner of majority opinion responsibilities. There is
evidence that Justice Stevens made strategic choices about
opinion assignments in some cases to gain or retain the
He also
necessary votes to keep his majority intact.
frequently self-assigned opinions to shape the law directly
with his own words and reasoning. Many of the majority
opinions assigned by Justice Stevens decided issues in cases
that are widely acknowledged to be of great importance for
the major controversies of his era, including the rights of gays
and lesbians, federal power, and access to the courts for
detainees suspected of participating in terrorist plots against
the United States. Whether or not these precedents survive
subsequent scrutiny by the Court as new Justices are
appointed in the coming decades, it is clear that these
opinions had a profound impact on American society and law
from the final decade of the twentieth century through the
first decade of the twenty-first century.

